Language and technology are both culture-bound. While technology arises from the needs of a particular culture, language helps in the storage, preservation, and transmission of both the culture and the technology from one generation to another. Language is one of man’s most powerful developmental tools. Language determines to a large extent how one’s thought processes and brain functionality are wired. It determines how one perceives, interprets, reconstructs, and transforms their immediate environment into a more conducive habitat. However, a fundamental problem (...) is that many learn and receive formal education today in the languages foreign to them. This, to some extent, hampers perception and understanding during instructional delivery, especially in areas where there is a discrepancy between the daily mode of communication and the official channel of academic instruction. The world would be richer if all people were to revert to their indigenous languages or to those of their earliest upbringing where they feel most natural and comfortable firsthand. The primary objective of this article therefore is to underline the irreplaceable and indispensable necessity of the need for academics and educational policymakers to prioritize once more the appropriateness of promoting as tools for teaching and learning, both the so called international languages and the indigenous ones. The immense spiritual density of local or indigenous languages provides them with such non-negligible keys for unlocking greater human potentialities over the ages in less time than their exclusion could ever achieve. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.4 (2000) 691-698 [Access article in PDF] Hume, Race, and Human Nature Emmanuel C. Eze Introduction John Immerwahr recently wrote in the Journal of the History of Ideas, "While Hume is generally known as an enemy of prejudice and intolerance, he is also infamous as a proponent of philosophical racism." 1 I am intrigued by this suggestion that Hume's is a "philosophical racism"; (...) one wonders: how many brands of racisms are there? What does "philosophical" racism mean? Assuming that philosophical racism is something which we wish to take notice of, what part of Hume's philosophy sustains it? How much of Hume's philosophy may be affected by this, and how profound?On the surface it seems not to make sense to ask, for example, how profound Hume's "philosophical racism" is or how deeply racist his philosophical works may be. The question appears contrived because, currently, every reference in the literature seem to point to only a footnote: I am apt to suspect the Negroes and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever discovered [End Page 691] any symptoms of ingenuity; tho' low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly. 2This was added, between 1753 and 1754, to the essay "Of National Characters." It was also revised in the final edition of the Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, which Hume had prepared shortly before he died in 1777. 3 Meanwhile, the original version of "Of National Characters" was written in 1748.An equally reasonable point of view on the matter, however, is to show that, far from being philosophically unimportant or an after-thought, the footnote, both its addition several years after the original essay was written and its maintenance in the subsequent revisions by Hume, suggests that the ideas expressed therein were important to the author and, significantly, to the arguments of "Of National Characters." It is known that by 1770 James Beattie, in An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Skepticism, had extensively criticized "Of National Character," specifically the note under consideration. Hume was aware of this and other criticisms and responded or commented on them in letters to friends, among other places. In a letter to his friend and publisher, William Straham, later published in London Chronicle (12-14 June 1777), Hume discussed dismissively criticisms from Thomas Reid and James Beattie, referring to the latter as "a bigoted silly fellow." 4 The fact that it survived Hume's multiple revisions and remained part of the Essays and was publicly defended from criticisms invites one not to dismiss this lengthy addition as marginal to Hume's thought but rather to determine why he might have felt it needed to be added in the first place, revised, and critically defended in what is now its definitive version. Relevant specific questions would be: why, of all other possible places (I have in mind, for example, a comparable essay "Of the populousness of ancient nations"), was the footnote added here? How does the opinion in this note relate to... (shrink)

Abstract Could the ?analytic? approach take greater roots in the traditions of African Philosophy? In this contribution, I give an affirmative answer to the question. However, I also argue that the process requires a ?political will?, as it involves a clear acknowledgement of the historical impetus animating the very idea?and contemporary institutional existences?of African philosophy.

Given that Enlightenment rationality developed in Europe as European nations aggressively claimed other parts of the world for their own enrichment, scholars have made rationality the subject of postcolonial critique, questioning its universality and objectivity. In _On Reason_, the late philosopher Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze demonstrates that rationality, and by extension philosophy, need not be renounced as manifestations or tools of Western imperialism. Examining reason in connection to the politics of difference—the cluster of issues known variously as cultural diversity, political (...) correctness, the culture wars, and identity politics—Eze expounds a rigorous argument that reason is produced through and because of difference. In so doing, he preserves reason as a human property while at the same time showing that it cannot be thought outside the realities of cultural diversity. Advocating rationality in a multicultural world, he proposes new ways of affirming both identity and difference. Eze draws on an extraordinary command of Western philosophical thought and a deep knowledge of African philosophy and cultural traditions. He explores models of rationality in the thought of philosophers from Aristotle, René Descartes, Francis Bacon, and Thomas Hobbes to Noam Chomsky, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Jacques Derrida, and he considers portrayals of reason in the work of the African thinkers and novelists Chinua Achebe, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, and Wole Soyinka. Eze reflects on contemporary thought about genetics, race, and postcolonial historiography as well as on the interplay between reason and unreason in the hearings of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. He contends that while rationality may have a foundational formality, any understanding of its foundation and form is dynamic, always based in historical and cultural circumstances. (shrink)

Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader sets out a timely and powerful agenda for contemporary African, Afro-Caribbean, and African American philosophy.

Bringing together canonical philosophical texts from African, African-American, Afro-Caribbean, and Black European thinkers, this major new anthology is designed to serve both as a textbook and as the authoritative reference volume in Africana philosophical and cultural studies.

Achieving Our Humanity explores a postracial future through a philosophical analysis of the social, cultural, economic and political experiences of race in the past and what this might mean for our present and, most importantly, our future.

There are international and so-called “global” forces framing Africa within a larger world, a world structured predominantly by Europe and North America and their needs for raw materials and markets, power, and leisure. This paper therefore pursues questions like, “What does democracy mean for Africans today?” and, “What does freedom mean when colonial liberation has been achieved?” or, to be more precise, “What is democracy in the world today from an African perspective?”. I distinguish between freedom (as the exercise of (...) autonomy and accompanying responsibility), and liberation (as the throwing off of foreign domination). I argue that democracy should be understood as a “concern for freedoms” (religious, economic, or political), and that democratic law seeks, in principle, the most space for the exercise of freedom for everyone. This conception of democracy is quite naturally the “other” face of the independence and liberation movements throughout Africa. (shrink)

There are international and so-called “global” forces framing Africa within a larger world, a world structured predominantly by Europe and North America and their needs for raw materials and markets, power, and leisure. This paper therefore pursues questions like, “What does democracy mean for Africans today?” and, “What does freedom mean when colonial liberation has been achieved?” or, to be more precise, “What is democracy in the world today from an African perspective?”. I distinguish between freedom (as the exercise of (...) autonomy and accompanying responsibility), and liberation (as the throwing off of foreign domination). I argue that democracy should be understood as a “concern for freedoms” (religious, economic, or political), and that democratic law seeks, in principle, the most space for the exercise of freedom for everyone. This conception of democracy is quite naturally the “other” face of the independence and liberation movements throughout Africa. (shrink)

This work is a sustained re-examination of philosophy's conception of "rationality" in general and "philosophic rationality" in particular. The history of Western philosophy is strongly marked by an objectivist conception of reason. Plato, Aristotle and Descartes believed that absolute and eternal Truth is accessible, and through their influence on Hume, Kant and Hegel among others, the history of modern European philosophy became one long quest for absolute certainty, total knowledge and "scientific" philosophy. ;Critical Modernism wants to construct a "chastened" idea (...) of reason, while maintaining that the emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment can be invigorated by addressing its weaknesses and defending its strengths. The theory of "communicative rationality," which is meant to fulfill this goal, claims to be comprehensive, fallible, criticizable, revisable and yet lays claim to objectivity. In contrast to critical modernism, however, is a Wittgenstein-inspired relativist trend which proposes a "language-game" theory of rationality . Under this conception, what is "rational" or "irrational" is held to be intersubjectively constituted within irreducible and variable contexts of "languages." ;This work does not take a position for or against objectivism or relativism, Habermas or Winch, but seeks to transcend both oppositions through an indirect critique that puts into question the very framing of the problem. The work establishes not only an alternative conception of rationality but also an idea of philosophical pluralism that allows for a revision of the framing of the question. This is accomplished through entering into the traditions of African philosophy and deriving from them a model of a metaphysical and epistemological framework that grounds itself outside of the objectivism-relativism problematic in its current strictural frame. This model, derived from the Ifa tradition, maintains dialogue with the Western traditions, but exposes the objectivism-relativism debate as falsely framed and provides from its own resources epistemological categories that place the problematic in a fresh context, within a larger, wider, pluralist, rational and philosophic worldview. (shrink)

This paper analyses selected recent African theological works on the conceptual relationships between church and society. The author highlights what can be universally learned from the African writings with reference to debates about faith and its relationship to ideals of social and political justice. Some recent books by African theologians have taken up the challenge of directly confronting questions that arise from the relationships between Africa's religions and their wider social and political environment. The paper shows how according to these (...) theologians the church in Africa must be judged by what it does and by what it does not do vis-à-vis the larger societies of which it is a part. (shrink)

The contents of what we transmit in colleges and universities as philosophic traditions need upgrading. But so do the methods of transmission.

The birth of a particular individual is contingent even though the doctrine of creation out of nothing teaches otherwise. Birth is an ontological invitation alerting the individual to inevitable death. In the intervening period along the path to death the individual is locked in the existential quest for truth. During his lifetime Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, was engaged in the complex quest for truth. His engagement in the search of the truth of and about Africa elevated him to the status (...) of one of the distinguished philosophers Africa has ever produced. This essay is in memory of Eze as an African philosopher, a philosopher engaged in the truth of and about post-colonial Africa. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27 2008: pp. 335-321. (shrink)

Most nonhuman animals live on the terms imposed on them by human beings. This condition of being under the mastery of another, or domination, is what republicanism identifies as political unfreedom. Yet there are several problems that must be solved in order to successfully extend republicanism to animals. Here I focus on the question of whether freedom can be a benefit for individuals without a free will. I argue that once we understand the grounds that make freedom a desirable property (...) of choices, we can see how it is appropriate to predicate it of those made by any sentient agent. (shrink)

Wild animals probably have net negative lives. Christine Korsgaard rejects the view that we might engineer paradise by redesigning nature and animals so that they have the best possible existences. She believes the genetic changes required would not be identity-preserving, thereby causing animals to cease to exist. I argue, first, that paradise engineering is permissible. Many harms are caused by non-sentient natural entities and processes. Moreover, sentient animals can survive modifications compatible with their psychological persistence over time. Second, we are (...) required to re-engineer nature in order to satisfy animals' right to the resources necessary for a reasonable life. (shrink)

On expectation, most wild animals have lives of net suffering due to naturogenic causes. Some have claimed that concern for their well-being gives us reasons to intervene in nature on their behalf. Against this, it has been said that many interventions to assist wild animals would be wrong, even if successful, because they would violate their freedom. According to the Freedom-based Approach I defend in this paper, this view is misguided. Concern for wild animal freedom does indeed gives us reasons (...) to secure these animals against control-undermining interferences, but also to intervene in nature in order to enrich their choices. (shrink)

Nonhuman animals are unable to exert any direct control over the functioning of democratic institutions –the decisions of which, nevertheless, have a pervasive impact on their lives. Their interests are therefore likelier to be set back or unfairly discounted, and their choices are more vulnerable to arbitrary interference. Because of this, some authors have suggested that we ought to redesign our political institutions so that they are more responsive to the interests of animals. We argue that this strategy fails to (...) address the root of the problem, which is animals’ lack of robust political agency. We defend that, should it become technologically feasible, we have a pro tanto obligation, derived from the values that underpin democracy, to uplift, or radically enhance, the political agency of nonhuman animals, so that they can better participate in mass democratic politics, express their interests as they see them, self-organise to defend them, and hold their representatives accountable. Finally, we explain how our argument manages to resist the most important objections against animal enhancement and, in some cases, it does so better than alternative proposals based on the value of animal well-being. (shrink)

Most non-human animals live in the wild and it is probable that suffering predominates in their lives due to natural events. Humans may at some point be able to engage in paradise engineering, or the modification of nature and animal organisms themselves, to improve the well-being of wild animals. We may, in other words, make nature 'red in tooth and claw' no more. We argue that this creates a tension between environmental ethics and animal ethics which is likely insurmountable. First, (...) we argue that concern for the environment can be compatible with helping individual wild animals but should see redesigning nature as morally impermissible. Second, we argue that if we are concerned with animal well-being, we may reject that we have a duty to help wild animals even to the point of redesigning nature, but we must nevertheless concede that it is permissible to do so under certain circumstances. We show how this permissibility can be derived from three animal rights views: Tom Regan's, a novel account inspired by Thomas Pogge and a libertarian approach to animal rights. (shrink)

Emergency contraceptives may sometimes prevent implantation, thereby causing the death of the embryo. According to some positions contrary to abortion, because the embryo is a human animal, there are usually decisive moral reasons not to use them. In this article, I will show that objecting to the use of emergency contraceptives on those grounds is unjustified. If organisms are real existents, then according to the most plausible conception of what is required for a group of cells to compose one, the (...) embryo cannot qualify as a single organism. On the other hand, if organisms are virtual objects, then whether or not the embryo qualifies as one is morally irrelevant. I conclude that even if those positions are right about the morality of abortion, they are not entitled to oppose the use of emergency contraceptives. (shrink)

En este artículo argumento sobre cuatro categorías diferentes de razones prácticas y las posibles combinaciones que admiten. Se explican apelando a las cuatro formas diferentes en las que la obtención de un estado de cosas puede ser valiosa. En primer lugar, explico la diferencia entre valores agencialmente-neutrales y agencialmente-relativos. En segundo lugar, distingo entre valores relativos-a-la-persona e impersonales. La combinación de estas categorías produce seis maneras posibles en las que la obtención de un estado de cosas puede ser valiosa -cuatro (...) básicas y dos derivadas. También muestra que no es posible para algo ser al mismo tiempo valioso de forma agencialmente-neutral y agencialmente-relativa. (shrink)

Preface In his book, African Philosophy, Theophilius Okere, after arguing that the way to African philosophy is the path of hermeneutics of culture, ...

In this essay, an attempt is made to re-present African Communitarianism as a discursive formation between the individual and community. It is a view which eschews the dominant position of many Africanist scholars on the primacy of the community over the individual in the ‘individual-community' debate in contemporary Africanist discourse. The relationship between the individual and community is dialogical for the identity of the individual and the community is dependent on this constitutive formation. The individual is not prior to the (...) community and neither is the community prior to the individual. Contemporaneity explains this dialogic relationship and to argue otherwise threatens the individual's subjectivity to a vanishing point, or simply, to deny the individual a presence. On this trajectory, the politics of common good within the African value system can neither be described nor represented through consensus or unanimity but through a realist perspectivism or a worldview not held in abstraction from living traditions, cultures, and values that characterize the people of sub-Saharan Africa. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27 2008: pp. 386-399. (shrink)

This paper argues that the dominant discourse on cosmopolitanism has largely focused on its constitutive character while ignoring its substantive essence. While recognizing the contribution made by other intellectual traditions, the paper argues that none of the approaches have yet answered basic questions of how to live with the stranger beyond the requirement of the law. The paper is also critical of those versions of cosmopolitanism that privileges subjective preference to members of our community over the stranger, or that advocates (...) eradication of boundaries as key condition for cosmopolitanism. The paper champions subjective equality through dialogue as a key condition for cosmopolitanism. Subjective equality on the other hand defines our terms of global justice. (shrink)

In this paper, I tried to show how Western attitude to reality can be traced to the divisive exclusivist type of mind-set behind Aristotle’s conception of the world. I gesture toward some of the severest consequences of approaching the world with such a mind-set, and how such has complicated matters in some of the major debates in African philosophy. By recourse to ibuanyidanda or complementary philosophy, the author explores ways of addressing some of the challenges approaches of this kind present (...) in view of resolving issues that have relevance for authentic existence. Keywords : Aristotle, ibuanyidanda, complementary ontology, Tempelsian Damage, ihe mkpuchi anya, missing link of reality. (shrink)

This research analyses media and online discourses produced by the Indigenous People of Biafra, a Nigerian separatist/secessionist group that seeks a referendum for the independence of the Igbo ethnic group of Nigeria. The research examines discourse structures, such as language use that clearly or implicitly produces propositions of conflict and war, tribalism and hate-speech. Discursive strategies such as labelling, exaggeration, metaphor and contradiction applied by the group to produce ideological discourses of outrage are also analysed. Moreover, conflicting discourses produced by (...) the Igbo politicians and factions of IPOB and other Biafra campaign groups are analysed in terms of their political implications to the overall self-determination efforts of the Biafra nation. The study concludes that the pragmatic implications of discourses that reflect opposing views, as well as varied ideological perspectives by group members, suggest that Biafra is a nation divided against itself and are a people incapable of the separate nation that they seek. (shrink)